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INTRODUCTION
Nonlegal enforcement systems come in many varieties. The
ordinary rules of everyday conduct are enforced by the gossip of
neighbors and scolding of friends; while, at the other extreme of
complexity, investors may comply with intricate financial arrange-
ments mainly to preserve their market reputation, rather than from
fear of lawsuit. The need for further typology is evident.
The Japanese products liability system and the transactional
rules of the American grain industry-carefully described in the
articles before us-represent two variants of a particular type of
nonlegal governance regime-a type in which the parties devise a
fairly comprehensive system that includes written rules of conduct,
sanctions, and procedures for enforcement. These systems are
established in a two-step process: first, norms evolve as a result of
transactors' dealings (as in the grain industry) or industry consensus
(standards identifying "design defects"); second, the centralized
agency selects among, codifies, and enforces these norms. The
substantive rules of conduct applicable to transactions are formu-
lated in part by courts and legislators, in part by nonlegal decision-
makers-trade organizations, independent standard setters, arbitra-
tors. Correlatively, the sanctions imposed for violation of the rules
are at first cut "nonlegal"-expulsion from the trade association or
revocation of the license to use a trade emblem. In the background,
courts stand ready to enforce the damages stipulated by law-
expectation damages for breach of contract and full compensation
for injuries suffered in tort.
In these settings, then, the nonlegal systems both displace in
part, yet rest upon, the extant legal regime. The systems represent
attempts to modify the background law-the products liability
regime as applied to consumer products and Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) for sales of grain. At the same
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time, the systems establish contracts that, although containing terms
that may differ from background law, would be enforceable as
contracts. Presumably, if the Japanese council as insurer refused to
honor the insurance contract, the consumer could go to court to
obtain compensation promised under the contract. The grain
traders can also go to court, although the court sometimes would be
bound by the contracts' arbitration provisions. And of course the
myriad background rules of tort, property, and contract structure
the markets within which these particular transactions occur.
Accepting the evidence provided by Bernstein and Ramseyer as
to the operation of these hybrid systems, this Comment addresses
some of the questions this evidence raises for our understanding of
the role of norms in their relation to legal governance. What do we
need to know about norms? What can we learn from the examples
here? In particular, I shall comment in Parts I and II.A on the
broad claim that nonlegal norms can supplant or importantly
supplement "public" regulation; in Part II.B on the claims that
emergent nonlegal norms are "efficient;" and in Part I.C on the
claim that the legal system generally should not provide legal
sanctions for violations of norms in commercial transactions.
I. METHODOLOGICAL QUESTIONS: WHAT Is AT STAKE?
The roots of the modern conception of norms in law and in
economics are Hayekian. Of course, modern social theory broadly
understood had been obsessed with the debate between those who
saw the just social order as necessarily "constructed" centrally and
by rational principles, and those who see it as proliferating benignly
by spontaneous generation from the decentralized, only locally
coordinated decisions of the members of society. Curiously,
however, this debate had until recently been of only marginal
importance in economics, and correlatively in the hybrid subdisci-
pline of law and economics.
In economics, the question of spontaneous generation had been
a central theme of Hayek, Schumpeter, and other, lesser members
of the "Austrian school."2 But Hayek's contribution had always
' Important articulations of Hayek's distinction between constructed legal rules
and evolved social norms are found in 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY:
RULES AND ORDER 8-34 (1973) (explaining the conflicting views that human
institutions are the products of deliberate design or the results of social evolution),
and F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 96-105 (1967)
(discussing the role of unintended consequences of human action in social theory).
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been treated as marginal by the mainstream Anglo-American
economic tradition, which culminated in the great general equilib-
rium theorems of the 1950s. The mathematical formalization of
general equilibrium theory depended upon methods and assump-
tions very different from Hayek's. In particular, a central problem
with integrating Hayek's insights lay in his conception of imperfect
information. Hayek's conception was epistemologically far more
radical than the conceptions of imperfect information built into
modem principal-agent models. In Hayek's conception, the
problem was not that a central planner (or indeed, many other
market participants) could not predict social actors' preferences, but
rather that it was not meaningful in principle to speak of these
preferences until the choices had actually been made-something
that could only be done by the participants themselves, not by some
central planner acting on their behalf. In contrast, students of the
law and economics of market relationships-particularly, those in
fields that most directly address the law that bears on market
transactions, like tort, contract, and regulated industries-inherited
the neoclassical approach, which works from particularized
informational deficiencies (or "transaction costs").
Consequently, contemporary legal and economic analysis arrives
at Hayekian principles obliquely-through a multivalent conception
of "norms-while avoiding the persistently unfashionable Hayekian
epistemology. In retrospect, the impetus for the move, first among
economists and then among law and economics scholars, is
apparent. For economists, norms first entered the picture to
explain conduct of macroeconomic importance that seemed
inconsistent with simple-minded utility maximization, such as the
stability of work effort and wages despite aggregate economic
fluctuations.' As such apparently "irrational" conduct is pervasive
in the phenomena that law addresses, the transfer of economics to
law demanded a correspondingly greater emphasis on a source of
conduct outside of a mere rational calculation about compliance
Useful interpretations of Hayek's thought and its importance are found in JOHN
GRAY, HAYEK ON LIBERTY (2d ed. 1986), and ROLAND KLEY, HAYEK'S SOCIAL AND
POLrICAL THOuGHT (1994). For related commentary in this symposium, see Robert
D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996) (commenting on
"legal centrism").
' The leading work was George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts As Partial Gift Exchange,
97 Q.J. EcoN. 543, 544 (1982) (describing employment arrangements as "gift-
exchanges" based on norms of behavior).
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with extant legal sanctions, which as a practical matter are often
minimal even for seriously harmful conduct. In short, one needed
to preserve the "rational actor" paradigm in the face of all sorts of
conduct that did not seem particularly rational.' Explaining that
individuals were responding to the pressures of the nonlegal
sanctions that attached to violations of nonlegal specified norms
provides a prolific means for doing so: particularly because one
can, in principle, posit a "sanction," such as shame before others or
a guilty conscience, that has whatever force is required to explain
the conduct at issue.
But the rhetoric of "norms" has served a second-dare one say
more overtly political?-function. Again, the connection is tight with
the move towards "imperfect information" economics, or more
generally with an economics that moves from a richer description
of human agency than the standard perfectly .informed utility-
maximizer. The difficulty arises with the political consequences of
the new economics-consequences that will lead us (at the end of
this Comment) to see the wisdom of the Hayekian approach to the
economistic vindication of conservative principles. It should be
remembered that even the most radically collectivized of economic
systems could be built on strictly neoclassical economic principles.
For every market, it came to seem, there was a market failure; and
for every market failure, a prescription for legal regulation or public
provision. The move to collectivism seemed to proceed even more
readily as individual agents were more cogently characterized as
ignorant and irrational: for then it was harder to explain the
advantages of decentralized as against centralized decisionmaking.
Indeed, advantages of centralized information gathering and
deliberation might improve the rationality of collective over
individualized decisionmaking.
"Norms" help to assure the conservative or anti-collectivist that
the limited laissez-faire approach of an austere common law regime
can achieve the proverbial best of both worlds. A nonlegal norm
system can aggregate the insights of a large number of individual
actors through mechanisms for the "evolution" of norms through
" More recently, irrational conduct has been detected even, for example, in what
were supposedly the most rational of markets, such as those dealing in securities. See,
e.g., Thomas Russell & Richard H. Thaler, The Relevance of Quasi Rationality in
CompetitiveMarkets, in RICHARD H. THALER, QuAsI RATIONAL EcONOMics 239,239-57
(1991) (describing the implications of rational and less-than-fully rational agents
interacting in competitive markets).
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some principle of rational selection.5 Although decentralized, a
nonlegal norm system might produce conduct that reflected the
comparatively greater degree of enlightenment of the norm-
generating procedures. In turn, as we just saw, the availability of a
system of nonlegal sanctions for violation of the rules of conduct
specified by the norm system would explain in terms of "rationality"
why individuals often acted in ways that seemingly departed from
rational self-interest.
Thus, the research program must specify the mechanisms by
which norms-particularly "efficient" norms-are formulated and the
procedures and sanctions by which norms are enforced.
II. ANALYSIS OF NORMS: EVIDENCE FROM
TRANSACTIONAL SYSTEMS
A. Where Do Norms Come From?
An efficiency claim for norms should depend on some account
of how the procedures that generate norms are likely to generate
efficient norms. A problem with the literature to date has been the
sheer diversity of types of nonlegal normative systems. Indeed, one
might question whether it is useful to use the same term ("norms")
for comprehensive and relatively complex regimes as for more
informal and diffuse sanctioning systems. With the systems that
Bernstein and Ramseyer describe, we are quite far from the bucolic
expanses of Shasta County or the watery wastes of the Great Banks,
whose regimes are most remarkably characterized by the sporadic
nature of the parties' interactions and the absence of a centralized
agency for formulating or enforcing rules. For the transactions
here, in contrast, we have such a "state-like" agency-indeed, in the
Japanese consumer liability case, an agency created by the state-that
regulates a dense network of sophisticated transactions.
A key feature for distinguishing among nonlegal sanctioning
systems is the type of conflict of interest among participants in the
systems. We should distinguish transactional systems-consumer
products in Japan, grain and feed in the United States-from two
other types: what I would call common-pool and external-harms
systems. In transactional systems, conflicts of interest arise because
'See e.g., Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1703, 1712-18 (1989) (describing three sources of
norms and the dominance of the contractual model in the creation of norms).
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of the disputes among the parties about an exchange of goods or
services. In common-pool systems, the parties face conflicts of
interest even in the absence of transactions among themselves
because all draw on a common pool that will be too quickly
exhausted unless the participants' conduct is regulated.6  In
external-harms systems, in contrast, the parties neither routinely
deal with one another nor routinely engage in conduct that requires
regulation because of its impact on other participants; but they are
in a relationship-such as the fabled railroad and farmer--in which
they may occasionally do harm to each other.
Both the common-pool and external-harms systems involve
production of public goods by regulating participants' conduct.
Note, however, the difference between the harms that each
participant does to the other in these two systems. In the common-
pool system, no single act of a party does substantial harm to
another; rather, it is the accumulation of the conduct of all parties
over time that must be regulated. In the external-harms system,
single acts cause substantial, identifiable harm to other partici-
pants-as when the railroad spark ignites a field of crops.
These structural differences are important to the relative
effectiveness of the norm systems. The transactional setting should
be a particularly favorable environment for the development of
effective norm systems. Repeated transactions provide ready oppor-
tunities for discipline of norm violators: the trading partner may
break off the transaction, and potential traders may refuse to deal
with the evildoer. Further, harms done in the course of transaction
are easily detected. Finally, the common features of transactions
will generate common regulatory interests among participants.
These features will be lacking in the classic common-pool and
external-harms cases, unless the participants in the latter systems
also happen to develop a thick network of trading relationships.
8
When one comes to formalization and centralization of norm
development and enforcement-the National Grain and Feed
6 The soon-to-be-classic discussion is ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS:
THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
' For an insightful analysis of this fable, see Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and
Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (1996).
' For example, Ellickson emphasizes that he expects that efficient norms are most
likely to evolve among members of a "close-knit community." See ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 184-206
(1991). In a sense, the ties among members of this community replace the disciplines
that would naturally arise in a network of trading relationships.
1996] WORMS" IN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS
Association (the "NGFA"), the Japanese Product Safety Council-a
different picture emerges. Formalization and centralization are
public goods that no individual transactor has adequate incentives
to develop if she adverts solely to her transactional interests. In this
sense, these goods are on par with the regulatory fruits of the
common-pool and external-harms systems; and one's ready faith in
the transactional systems' spontaneous emergence from private
marketplace activity therefore breaks down. Formalization and
centralization will emerge only after public action-the initiative of
the state agency--or after a form of organizational entrepreneurship
that is political in motivation-motivated, for example, by a vision of
social order whose realization the individual takes as a good even
beyond its direct material benefit to him.' Thus, the NGFA and
like agricultural organizations emerged from the agrarian populist
movements of the nineteenth century.
10
The political impulse towards organization is crucial because
merely decentralized, spontaneously generated norms are unlikely
to be of use in complex, geographically dispersed, mass markets.
The evidence for this is clear in the cases before us. The NGFA
formalized norms in order to achieve uniformity in the national
market, so that geographically dispersed traders could rely on
dealing with each other under a common set of standards.
Similarly, the key feature of the Japanese products systems are the
simple insignias ("S" and "SG") available at first to all domestic
products, and now to imported goods as well. Enforcement of the
norms is also now accomplished through unified procedural systems
established by these centralized agencies. Evidently, mere decentral-
' The good may derive either from a sense of altruism, from a pleasure in
accomplishment or imposition on others, or from a sheer enjoyment in the process
of political organization itself. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION
(1963) (providing a classic discussion of conceptions of political action as an inherent
good).
10 In more traditional societies, centralizing and formalizing tendencies may arise
from common religious or ethnic affiliations as well. Examples in the literature
include groups as diverse as the ethnic Chinese in South Asia, orthodox Jewish
diamond traders, monastic producers of Bordeaux wine, and Maghrebi merchants.
See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations
in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (describing the relations of
traders in the New York diamond industry in resolving disputes);Janet T. Landa, A
Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to
Contract Law, 10J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1981) (describing the function and structure of
Chinese middleman groups and how these groups reduced transaction costs and
facilitated exchanges in the absence of contract laws).
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ized generation and enforcement of norms is too fragmented and
haphazard to achieve effectiveness across large markets.
B. Are Norms Efficient?
In the absence of a reliable metric for determining the substan-
tive efficiency of particular norms, it seems crucial to be able to
point to features in the process of norm generation and enforcement
that at least suggest that the resulting norms would be efficient. In
the cases before us, however, the efficiency of norm formulation is
puzzling. The formulators here are not the innocently decentralized
village gossips described in many parables about norms; they are
sophisticated political organizations apparently dominated by
cohesive groups whose members share a common interest. In terms
of "public choice" theory, then, we have an almost formulaic
situation for generating inefficient norms-norms that favor the
members of the concentrated interest groups, at the expense of
more diffuse members. An account of these organizations as
efficient, then, must prescind from standard public choice theory's
disdain of political activity as mere predatory rent-seeking. What is
it about this "norm" setting, then, that might provide assurance that
an efficiency theorem for norms might go through?
The Japanese consumer products system provides a relatively
simple case for analysis. Note that producers voluntarily opt in to
the system. Presumably, they do so when the SG label will help
them sell products to consumers, increasing sales enough to justify
whatever costs of compliance are incurred in qualifying for the
label."1 If consumers are well informed about what the SG label
means, then, clearly the labelling system induces an optimal level of
safety in consumer products.
Unfortunately, then, key aspects of the system remain shrouded
in the inscrutability with which the Orient remains vulgarly
associated, despite the best efforts of researchers like Ramseyer to
explain its puzzling features. In the case at hand, for example,
neitherJapanese consumers nor we know much about the substance
of the liability standard or the procedures for assessing claims. The
safety "norms" were formulated by an expert tribunal and adopted
unilaterally, and there is no evidence that the consumers had any
knowledge of them. One must wonder, given this dearth of
" More technically, when the benefits to the consumer of the regime outweigh the
costs to the manufacturers of subjecting themselves to it.
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information, whether consumers themselves are in a position to
make intelligent decisions about the value of the warranty protec-
tions offered. 2
Further, one can hypothesize that in some circumstances
manufacturers clearly gain from this norm-generating and -enforc-
ing system, even if it does not offer protections that consumers
rationally can value. Of course, it may be that consumers are simply
fooled into attaching value to these protections-like our own "Good
Housekeeping" seal of approval."3 Or the industry may see the
system as a promising way of avoiding other litigation. Here the
analogy to workers' compensation is suggestive. On standard public
choice theory, the most plausible explanation for widespread
adoption of workers' compensation would be the power of concen-
trated interest groups-here, the large industrial manufacturers-to
reduce their liability for industrial accidents by substituting cheap,
low-recovery liability systems for the procedurally costly and
potentially high-recovery tort system.
14
The grain and feed industry provides a harder case both for
explaining why the norms might be efficient and for assessing
whether they are or not. One problem is that-unlike the Japanese
product liability case-the grain and feed industry provides no
competitive choice between transactors who subject themselves to
the rules and those who do not. Unlike the Japanese consumer, the
buyer or seller of grain cannot choose to transact either with a
partner who is subject to the norms or with one who may depart
12 Of course, consumers have a number of informal methods for getting
information, such as word-of-mouth anecdotes gleaned from friends. If the accident
rate is as low as postulated by Ramseyer in his hypothetical case, however, it seems
unlikely that most consumers have even this sort of indirect contact with the system;
surely, it would be unlikely that a potential consumer would know anyone who had
actually had experience, either favorable or unfavorable, with the claims system.
Is Is it rational to put much stock in a system about which one has almost no
information? Faced with the well-accepted body of evidence on the irrationality of
decisionmakingin the most ordinary contexts, see, e.g., RICHARD NISBETr & LEE ROSS,
HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 273-96
(1980), and the contestability of conceptions of rationality themselves, see, e.g., ALLAN
GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS: A THEORY OF NORMATIVE JUDGMENT 6-22
(1990), it seems ill-advised to proceed to draw social conclusions by assuming that
apparently ill-informed consumers are rational in the economic sense of maximizing
expected utility.
1 In particular, this fits with the growing popularity among manufacturers of
"industrial compensation systems" as the courts eroded the common law defenses
provided by the fellow-servant rule, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk.
The historical background is described by Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins
and Economics of Workers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775 (1982).
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from them with impunity. Thus, the competitive pressures toward
efficient choice of norms-that transactors faced with alternative
menus of rules will choose the most desirable ones-are simply
absent.
A second complicating feature for analysis lies in the process by
which norms are chosen for institutional enforcement. While we do
not know how the Product Safety Commission goes about defining
"defect," we have some sense-thanks to Bernstein's pioneering
work-about how the NGFA determines its norms. Apparently,
norms emerge in two stages. First, norms in a sense emerge
"spontaneously" as a result of the conduct of dispersed transactors.
Second, the NGFA selects some of these norms for codification and/
or arbitral enforcement. An efficiency claim requires that one
assess the process at each stage. First, in the evolution of norms,
selection of norms must be efficient: for example, norms must be
selected by the standard mechanism of individuals choosing to
transact with partners who follow the desired norms. Second, in
selection of norms for enforcement, the organization must be free of
rent-seeking and reasonably well informed by some deliberative
process.
Nonetheless, in the face of these complexities, one can construct
an argument in theory that the industry has an incentive to adopt
the optimal set of norms. Two types of arguments-corresponding
to two slightly different sets of "stylized facts"-are available here.15
First, the familiar argument about the efficient production choices
of monopolists may extend to this case. Recall that the monopolist
exploits his monopoly power by raising prices, not by adopting
onerous (that is, inefficient) contract terms. To the extent that a
group of traders are intelligently exerting monopoly power vis-a-vis
outsiders-at either stage of the process of norm formulation-one
would expect like behavior: the group would raise prices, not
impose onerous trading terms. This requires, however, that insiders
be in a position to discriminate in price between other insiders and
outsiders; it is not clear how this form of cartelization would be
sustained in a many-participant market for relatively homogeneous
commodities like grain.
Second, it may be that there are simply no outsiders to be
potential victims of monopolistic practices: all traders are members
15 The analysis here is a subset of the broader problem of the efficiency of group
norms vis-a-vis outsiders; my analysis applies to cases of transactional norms. For
remarks about the problem in other settings, see Posner, supra note 7, at 1708-09.
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of the rule-setting groups. In terms of efficient norms, there are
then two subcases to consider. In one case, the traders are
alternately buyers, sellers, middlemen, and so forth: that is, they
engage indiscriminately in the various transactional roles and thus
have no special interest peculiar to their trading status. This
sharing of roles accomplishes stochastically a type of Rawlsian "veil
of ignorance": not knowing which role will predominate in future
transactions, the transactors will abstract from the partial (distribu-
tive or rent-seeking) interests that various subgroups of buyers,
sellers, and so forth might have; instead, they will simply favor the
rule that minimizes costs over all groups.
In the other subcase, traders break down into subgroups-there
are distinct groups of traders who are predominantly buyers, sellers,
or middlemen-but mechanisms come into play to thwart rent-
seeking. For spontaneous emergence of norms, perhaps the
dispersal of numerous transactors prevents coordination to impose
inefficient norms; for institutional selection, the NGFA's apparatus
may be designed sagaciously to prevent predominance by any
particular subgroup that seeks to promote its private interests.
In the grain and feed case, traders apparently have heteroge-
neous interests. Although they assume multiple roles (buyers and
sellers), we do not know whether one role would tend to predomi-
nate for each trader, thereby defining his interests in terms of that
role. Presumably, some traders clearly see themselves as primarily
buyers or sellers-farmers who raise grain are sellers, end-users of
grain are buyers. Further, we face a clear demarcation between
"large" and "small" traders: the large traders are defined as those
whose transactions are sufficiently numerous to support a bureau-
cratic hierarchy of managers who presumably supply information-
processing, organizational, and legal expertise to those below. All
of this describes a group sufficiently heterogeneous to make one
skeptical that any of the simple mechanisms for generating efficient
norms are operating. Bernstein identifies this set of questions-
particularly, the distinct interests and influences of large and small
traders-as important questions for future research, and I agree.
Suffice it for now to conclude that, in this carefully described milieu
for norm generation, the efficiency hypothesis requires substantial
further research before it can enjoy even tentative assent.
As one turns norm formulation to norm enforcement, the
attempt to assess efficiency reaches equally puzzling results.
Presumably, the informal arbitration procedures are cheaper, on a
case-by-case basis, than would be a corresponding full judicial trial
1996] 1851
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of the same issues. It may be that these informal tribunals are
"expert" and therefore more accurate, although, curiously, both
Bernstein and Ramseyer ask us to take these assertions on faith. 6
It may simply reflect lawyers' own cult of expertise that they are so
ready to assume that other specialists, such as lay commercial
arbitrators or standard setting agencies, are equally expert-despite
a growing body of literature that raises deep questions about such
claims of expertise." One would like to know about what the
"specialists" actually "know," and also about protections against the
bias that is familiar in other arbitral settings, such as those involving
employment and securities claims.
Even stipulating that these informal hearings are cheaper and
somewhat more accurate than trials, there remains a question
whether these adjudicatory systems taken as a whole are cheaper for
the participants than recourse to judicial proceedings. It may be,
for example, that the availability of cheaper and simpler proceed-
ings encourages parties to "litigate" many cases that they could
readily settle among themselves, if the only alternative were the
more expensive judicial suit. "Repeat transactors" may prefer
arbitration simply because they believe that they enjoy an advantage
over one-shot transactors in dealing with the arbitral establishment;
repeat transactors can generally impose such an advantageous
procedure through a contract term stipulating for arbitration.
Moreover, reliance on such informal systems is particularly
problematic because one loses the "public goods" associated with
more formal litigation: development of a set of precedents; public
revelation of information about such important policy matters as
accident rates; and, relevant to this Symposium, the use of judicial
decision to propagate and reinforce social norms."8 Note that all
of these are goods that the parties themselves-particularly powerful
repeat transactors-would have no incentive to consider or, indeed,
may see as costs to themselves, although they are benefits from the
social point of view.
19
' See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 1771-77; Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 1828-29.
17A powerful recent discussion is provided by Richard H. Pildes & Cass R.
Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatoy State, 62 U. CH. L. REv. 1, 33-65 (1995).
" See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984)
(preferring adjudication over alternative dispute resolution because, among other
reasons, adjudication makes decisions public and sets precedents).
"9 Manufacturers of consumer goods reap obvious advantages from keeping
product accident rates and safety standards secret.
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C. When Should Norms Be Incorporated into Legal Rules?
Bernstein's important work not only displays a system in which
the transactors have subjected themselves to a formalized set of
norms enforced through nonlegal sanctions. She argues as well that
the internal operation of this norm system sheds light on an impor-
tant question about norms-whether the legal system should enforce
these norms in its regulation of transactions. She suggests, contrary
to a generation of wisdom, that it should not, at least in the case of
sales of goods governed by the UCC. I turn now to this second
substantive conclusion of Bernstein's analysis: that Article 2 of the
UCC incorrectly attempts to incorporate informal nonlegal norms
into the parties' legal obligations as enforceable contract terms. As
Bernstein observes, her attack is upon the fundamental premise of
Article 2, as espoused by the drafter Karl Llewellyn.
2 0
My colleague Mary Ann Glendon brilliantly depicts Karl
Llewellyn as the Matisse of legal modernism.2 1 Matisse's quip that
he wanted looking at his paintings to be as comfortable as sitting in
a plush armchair 22 is certainly consistent with this image. The
peculiar comforts proffered by Article 2 of the UCC-some of whose
provisions might seem to lack the requisite element of coziness-
came from the essentially clubby assumption that the rules of law
should conform to, indeed, be derived from, the assumptions and
understandings of the ordinary, honest transactor-a sort of
merchant homme moyen sensuel who, finally, in the UCC, would find
a set of rules that made sense to him.
Llewellyn could hardly have been motivated in his suggestion
by a concern for "efficiency" in any of its contemporary senses;
indeed, the various elements of this plural conception had hardly
been formulated at the time that Llewellyn worked. 2' Rather,
2' Of course, although the fundamental premise, it is not uniformly implemented
in the specific rules of Article 2. For example, as Bernstein recounts, the perfect
tender rule is inconsistent-a bit of formalism that survived because of the
overwhelming pressure of business persons to prevent their norms from being
imported into the Code. See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 1801.
21 
See MARY A. GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE
LEGAL PROFESSION Is TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 191 (1994) ("If Holmes was
the harsh, bold Picasso of legal modernism, Karl Llewellyn was its exuberant
Matisse.").
' SeeJack Flam, Introduction to MATISSE: A RETROSPECTIVE 21, 23 (Jack Flam ed.,
1988).
2' See Russell Hardin, Magic on the Frontier:. The Norm of Efficiency, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1987 (1996) (discussing the development of the "efficiency norm" in law).
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Llewellyn's approach finds its roots most directly in a Hayekian
belief in the wisdom and durability of embedded social norms,
which the law would adopt if enlightened and would oppose at its
peril. The merchant judges dreamed of by Llewellyn are of a piece
with the wise men whom Hayek commended as judges for his
common-law-based constitutional regime.
24
Contemporary studies, founded in conceptions of game theory,
present a considerably less benign, more agonistic picture of
commercial relationships, correlatively questioning the adjudicative
theories that found the organic approach to social norms advocated
by Hayek and Llewellyn. The basic conception of the modem
approach-in sharp contradistinction to that of Hayek and
Llewellyn-is that the rules that parties follow when they play among
themselves are not those that a court should attempt to apply.
Here, Bernstein's work is exemplary.
Of course, commentators have long argued that the norms that
ordinarily govern commercial life should not be incorporated into
the legal standards for contract enforcement.25  Bernstein's
contribution is to display in detail a private commercial system that
apparently fits the commentators' predictions. Unfortunately, on
the basis of evidence from NGFA practice, one can go only a small
way toward endorsing a sharp separation between commercial
norms and legal rules or, particularly, rejecting the jurisprudential
approach of the UCC.
Of course, it is inevitable that basic commercial systems-under
any plausible system of adjudication-define certain basic concep-
tions by reference to the underlying commercial practices that give
these conceptions meaning. Thus, for example, the NGFA offers
practice-oriented definitions for such seemingly elementary terms
as "buy," "sell," "deliver," "confirmation," and "price." Llewellyn
understood-and NGFA practice confirms-that such terms cannot
24 On this strand of Hayek's work, see Richard Bellamy, "Dethroning Politics":
Liberalism, Constitutionalism and Democracy in the Thought ofF. A. Hayek, 24 BRrr. J.
POL. Sci. 419, 426-28 (1994) (discussing the substance of Hayek's constitutional
scheme whereby "legislators" would be accountable to moral principles rather than
the self-interested will of the majority). The common intellectual influences among
Hayek, Llewellyn, and other thinkers in this tradition are described by James
Whitman, Note, Commercial Law and the American Volk. A Note on Llewellyn's German
Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 156 (1987).
' See, e.g., David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARv.
L. REv. 373 (1990) (discussing the effects of nonlegal sanctions on commercial
transactions and arguing for a legal system that will not give estoppel effect to those
commitments not intended to be legally enforceable).
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be defined in a formalistic vacuum. Beyond these definitions, the
NGFA code is in large part a compendium of industry norms, and
the main virtue of nonjudicial arbitral decisionmaking is the ability
to apply uncodified expertise about industry custom when interpret-
ing particular agreements or fact patterns. In these circumstances,
it would be merely ironic to assert that NGFA transactors have
adopted a code designed to exclude application of various industry
"norms" to their disputes. In fact, it is not clear that the NGFA is
up to anything inconsistent with what was contemplated by UCC
jurisprudence. Clearly, something more complicated than the
simple exclusion of custom is at work.
Most evidently, transactors (at least, those transactors who act
through the industry association) have selected some norms for
enforcement but not others. Apparently, what the norm selectors
are aiming for is uniformity. But how did they pick and choose
among the various norms on offer? It is tempting to conclude, as
Bernstein hints, that large transactors may have been choosing to
enforce the norms that served their own interests. Or they may
have chosen simple "focal point" norms, even though these were not
substantively the most efficient. So the practice of the Association
may not indicate that there is a gap between the norms followed by
transactors and the substance of the rules that it would be desirable
for courts to enforce.
Nor can one infer from the grain and feed regime that the
parties would not wish norms to be enforced through the courts
when their disputes ended up there-particularly when there was no
substitute enforcement system available. For the UCC drafters, the
question of norm incorporation had to be decided as an entirely
general manner-ironically, abstracting from particular circum-
stances of particular industries to which the UCC would end up
applying. From this perspective, it is hard to conclude from
Bernstein's evidence that the drafters made the wrong choice.
Clearly, grain and feed transactors prefer that a fairly elaborate set
of norms be enforced when they take disputes to third-party dispute
resolution. Would such transactors really wish that courts ignore all
of these norms if the more informal third-party system were not
available? Of course, it is possible that the courts are so likely to
"get it wrong," and at elaborate expense, that the parties would
prefer a highly formalistic system, but it is equally possible that the
parties would prefer an occasionally erroneous effort to apply their
norms over legal rules that made no attempt at all to make sense of
their commercial practice. What we need, of course, is not an a
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priori speculation, but evidence of their preference-and the
evidence to date points equally in both directions.
2 6
Indeed, it is difficult to know what types of evidence would
count for this because of the purported difficulty of "opting out" of
the UCC's interpretive sections about custom. Presumably, one
would like to measure the extent to which parties incurred costs to
opt out of particular norms. But this creates a paradoxical
situation: if parties are frequently opting out, then the costs of
doing so are presumably not that great, and the case for law reform
weakens considerably. 2  Conversely, if opt-outs are expensive to
draft or risky to use, one may rarely observe them despite high costs
imposed by the UCC's inappropriate rules. It is also hard to
measure the number of transactions that do not go through at all
because of the UCC's potentially stultifying rules.
Even if we accept that most parties conform to a body of
nonlegal norms that they do not wish to see enforced, problems of
interpreting this phenomenon remain. Let me mention two. First,
the stipulated distinction between ongoing and end-game relation-
ships, though provocative in this context and consistent with a large
body of theoretical literature, is itself "endogenous" to the set of
norms (and to the characteristics of the legal enforcement system)
at issue. For example, workers continue to work for their employers
through the period of union arbitration on issues of pay and
promotion; if workers have been fired, they return to work after a
finding of unlawful discharge. As the labor relationship illustrates,
then, the norm itself-that litigation is inconsistent with a continuing
relationship-is socially contingent.
I would propose-in part on the basis of Bernstein's evidence-
that the crucial distinction would be one between sharing norms and
punitive norms. Parties split the losses when they are amicable; but
' The Solomonic compromise proposed at the end of Bernstein's article-making
it easier for the industry to opt out-is clearly appealing, see Bernstein, supra note 1,
at 1821, but it does not address the UCC drafter's central dilemma: that of adopting
interpretive conventions to be codified in a general statute as applicable, in the
absence of contrary indications, across the board.
2" Note that-contrary to what many commentators assume-the UCC's default rule
may be appropriate even though most parties opt out of it. The pertinent question
is the costs of opt-out as contrasted to the costs of alternative rules. See generally David
Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89
MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1847-48 (1991). A more formalistic UCC could impose very high
costs on the small group of transactors who rely to their detriment on informal
norms; avoidance of these latter costs arguably wouldjustify the relatively small costs
imposed on sophisticated transactors who wish to opt out of UCC informalism.
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when one party willfully or egregiously violates a norm, the other
party (or the system) punishes the wrongdoer-formally, imposes
losses on the wrongdoer greater than the gains the wrongdoer
would have derived from his wrongful conduct. In labor economics,
for example, the "shirking" worker must face a punishment far
greater than the benefits gained by him from shirking (loss of job,
with consequent sacrifice of a "bond") in order to create incentives
not to shirk. But application of a punitive norm need not end the
relationship for all transaction-types-the repentant shirking worker
seems at times to have been accepted back into the fold.
Second, before drawing normative conclusions for practices
linked to "norms," one must assure that the relevant transactors are
properly informed about the norms at issue, as well as about facts
pertinent to norm formulation and application. One ground for
judicial intervention to enforce or modify norms is to correct
parties' mistakes about what norms apply or how effective the
sanctions that enforce the norms outside of the law are.28 For
example, naive parties may be the victim of exploitative conduct-a
form of socially wasteful "rent-seeking"-by their more sophisticated
counterparts, and transactions by misinformed parties may
misallocate resources, from a social point of view. Bernstein's
analysis suggests that there may be a class of nave transactors:
transactors who lack the skill and "technology" (like lawyers or a
bureaucracy) for careful form contracting, and who may rely
mistakenly on informal norms. For these transactors, the UCC
norms of informality may provide substantial and justified protec-
tions.
CONCLUSION
All of this leads up to a concluding comment about the
methodology of a conception of "norms." Here, as always, it is
crucial to distinguish between positive and normative uses of the
conception. For positive work, the conception of norms continues
to generate stimulating and powerful hypotheses on transactional
systems, as exemplified in this Symposium by the important work of
Bernstein and of Johnston on the UCC. As a normative matter,
however, I am skeptical that economic analysis can generate,
through notions such as "efficiency," a useful set of socialjudgments
2
' Seegenerally Charny, supra note 25, at 426-46 (arguing that legal decisionmakers
may improve the position of transactors by enforcing nonlegal commitments).
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about norms. There are simply too many unobservable variables,
particularly those that bear on the "noneconomic" motivations and
preferences that must play a role in the start-up and the effective-
ness of complex sanctioning systems.
For a normative perspective, then, one is led to return to the
Hayekian roots of the current interest in norms. Hayek's insistence
on the impenetrability of human preferences-and, correspondingly,
the impossibility of their satisfaction through centralized institu-
tions-might have provided a stronger ground (at least, than
anything in modern welfare economics) for a presumptivejudgment
in favor of nonlegal normative systems. The normative project,
then, would be to describe, not only the efficiency but also the
other, as yet, largely inchoate or unarticulated social virtues of these
systems. Ironically, then, it would be in the irrationality, not the
rationality, of social actors that the authority of these systems is
ultimately grounded.
